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TIME TO PRUNE THE FLORA—PROCEDURAL 
DUE PROCESS, THE FULL PAYMENT RULE 
AND ASSESSABLE PENALTIES: LARSON V. 
UNITED STATES 
FRANK G. COLELLA* 
ABSTRACT 
In Larson v. United States, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals rejected the opportunity to limit the scope of the Flora 
“full payment” rule when its strict application in the instant case 
foreclosed judicial review of the underlying tax controversy. As a 
result, the decision rubberstamped the IRS’s imposition of assessable 
penalties without any meaningful judicial review of those actions. 
The Article argues that the court’s decision to blindly apply the 
full payment rule, without considering any form of a hardship 
exception, effectively denied John Larson his right to due process 
of law as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 
                                                                                                             
* The author is a Clinical Professor of Legal Studies & Taxation, Pace 
University Lubin School of Business, a faculty member of the International 
Management Development Programme, Paris, France, and a practicing attorney. 
LL.M. (in taxation), New York University School of Law, JD, cum laude, Brooklyn 
Law School; and B.B.A., cum laude, Pace University. He is especially grateful 
to Patricia S. Colella, Esq., for her invaluable assistance in the preparation of 
this Article. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Larson v. United States,1 the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals rejected the opportunity to limit the scope of the Flora2 full 
payment rule when the de facto consequence of its application to 
assessable penalties foreclosed judicial review of the underlying 
tax dispute. The practical consequence of Larson’s rigid adherence 
to the full payment rule was to rubberstamp the Internal Revenue 
Service’s (IRS) imposition of certain assessable penalties without 
any judicial review of the IRS’s determination.3 When considered 
in the context of procedural due process jurisprudence, the Second 
Circuit’s refusal to limit the draconian impact of the Flora rule 
in Larson precluded any judicial review4 and, effectively, denied 
Larson the right to due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.5 
                                                                                                             
1 Larson v. United States (Larson II), 888 F.3d 578, 583–84 (2d Cir. 2018), 
aff’g, No. 16-CV-00245, 2016 WL 7471338 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2016) (Larson I). 
2 Flora v. United States (Flora I), 357 U.S. 63 (1958), aff’d on reh’g, 362 
U.S. 145 (1960) (Flora II). In Flora II, a divided Supreme Court held that a federal 
court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate taxpayer challenges to an IRS determination 
is premised upon the full payment of the underlying amount in dispute. 362 
U.S. at 146. Subject to narrow exceptions, partial payment of the disputed 
amount denies the court subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim. See infra 
notes 74–88 and accompanying text. 
3 See Larson II, 888 F.3d at 583. 
4 The opportunity for limited judicial review of the underlying liability fol-
lowing a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing, I.R.C. § 6320 (Liens) & section 
6330 (Levies), may have been foreclosed as a result of the administrative appeal. 
See infra note 207. However, judicial review of the tax liability may still be 
available in a bankruptcy court proceeding. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 505 (2012) 
(Determination of Tax Liability). While Larson may benefit from a bankruptcy 
proceeding, a detailed discussion of the Bankruptcy Code is beyond the scope 
of this Article. See infra note 243 and accompanying text. 
5 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law[.]”). The Larson decision was specifically 
cited by Nina E. Olsen, the National Taxpayer Advocate as part of the Legislative 
Recommendations included her report to Congress. Nina E. Olsen, National 
Taxpayer Advocate 2018 Annual Report to Congress (2019), https://taxpayer 
advocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2018-ARC/ARC18_Volume1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9SSC-G3JG] [hereinafter NTA 2018 Annual Report]. In Volume 
One of the report where Legislative Recommendation #3 Fix the Flora Rule: 
Give Taxpayers Who Cannot Pay the Same Access to Judicial Review as Those 
Who Can from the Executive Summary is more fully discussed, Example 4, 
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 Generally, meaningful pre-payment judicial review is availa-
ble in the United States Tax Court via deficiency proceedings, 
where the taxpayer can challenge the IRS’s assertion of additional 
tax liability and/or penalty imposition without first having to pay 
the sum so demanded.6 However, the availability of pre-payment 
judicial review in the Tax Court is glaringly absent in certain 
assessable penalty cases.7 In those cases, taxpayers may only obtain 
judicial review after the assessed penalty has been paid in full.8 
This outcome is not the result of any specific statutory directive; 
rather, it results from the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
statute that authorizes federal courts to hear taxpayer refund 
actions against the IRS.9 
 The only judicial review in assessable penalty cases is avail-
able post-payment.10 A taxpayer must first fully pay the penalty 
and then seek post-payment judicial review of the liability in 
federal district court (or the federal Court of Claims).11 There is, 
generally, no opportunity for pre-payment judicial review.12 There 
is, theoretically, an opportunity for limited judicial review in a 
Collection Due Process (“CDP”) hearing at the end-stage of IRS 
efforts to collect the liability.13 Unfortunately, IRS regulations, 
                                                                                                             
which considers assessable penalties too large to pay, is taken from the Larson 
fact pattern: “Example 4: Assessable Penalties That Are Too Large to Pay Are 
Not Subject to Judicial Review.” NTA 2018 Annual Report, supra, Volume One 
at 366. “This hypothetical example was loosely inspired by Larson v. United 
States[.]” Id. at n.15. 
6 See infra note 41 and accompanying text. See generally MICHAEL I. 
SALTZMAN & LESLIE BOOK, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, Ch. 10 (Assessment 
Procedures) (2019). 
7 See infra notes 62–67 and accompanying text. 
8 Id. 
9 See Flora II, 362 U.S. 145, 146 (1960). 
10 See generally SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 6, at Ch. 11 (Overpayment, 
Refund, Credit and Abatement). 
11 See, e.g., Larson II, 888 F.3d 578, 583 n.5 (2d Cir. 2018) (“Federal dis-
trict courts have original jurisdiction over such refund actions concurrently with 
the United States Court of Federal Claims.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a))). Refer-
ences to U.S. district courts in this Article, for purposes of refund litigation, 
also include the federal Court of Claims. 
12 In certain cases, Congress has authorized partial payment of certain as-
sessable penalties. See infra note 143 and accompanying text. In others, where 
the assessable penalties are divisible, Courts require payment of just one penalty 
to secure the requisite jurisdiction. See infra notes 86–87 and accompanying text. 
13 See SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 6, at Ch. 14B (Collection Due Process). 
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and court decisions that have interpreted those regulations, have 
made even that limited review unavailable for taxpayers who have 
already had an administrative review of the liability in question.14 
 Remarkably, when the sheer size of the penalty imposed,15 
such as the initial $160 million assessed in Larson,16 results in a 
situation where the taxpayer cannot, demonstrably, pay the full 
amount demanded by the IRS, the notion that post-payment 
judicial review is available to challenge the IRS determination is 
entirely illusory. That outcome, where a taxpayer is denied both 
pre- and post-payment access to the court system, results in a 
complete victory for the IRS. Not only is the IRS automatically 
victorious in those circumstances, but its actions also evade any 
judicial scrutiny whatsoever.17 
 Constitutional due process cannot mean that judicial re-
view is available only to those taxpayers who are financially well-off 
enough to pay for it.18 Not only does such a paradigm punish the 
                                                                                                             
14 See infra notes 73 & 207 and accompanying text. 
15 See, for example, Diversified Grp. Inc. v. United States, where the initial 
assessed penalty under I.R.C. § 6707 was $42.1 million. 841 F.3d 975, 978–79 
(Fed. Cir. 2016). That figure was subsequently reduced by $17.2 million to 
reflect payments made by additional joint tortfeasors. Id. at 979. See also I.R.S. 
Gen. Couns. Mem. 201150029 (Nov. 9, 2011) (“The Court [Flora] did recognize, 
however, that in some instances full payment may not be necessary, for example, 
in the case of excise taxes which ‘may be divisible into a tax on each transac-
tion or event.’ From that recognition was born the “divisible tax” exception to 
the full payment rule. Where a tax is considered a ‘divisible tax,’ the taxpayer 
need only pay a portion of the tax before instituting suit (assuming other ju-
risdictional prerequisites are met).” (citations omitted) (emphasis added)). 
16 Larson II, 888 F.3d 578, 581 (2d Cir. 2018). 
17 See NTA 2018 Annual Report, supra note 5. 
18 The paradox that confronted Larson is not limited to high income tax-
payers. The Legal Services Center of Harvard Law School’s Federal Tax Clinic 
filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the Appellant. See Amicus Brief for 
the Appellant Supporting Reversal at 1, Larson II, 888 F.3d 578 (2d Cir. 2018) 
(No. 17-503) [hereinafter Harvard Amicus Brief] (“We write to describe to the 
court how applying the Flora full payment rule to assessable penalties harms 
low-income taxpayers.”). See, e.g., Kahn v. United States, 753 F.2d 1208 (3d 
Cir. 1985), discussed infra notes 119–21, in which the taxpayer was unable to 
pay a $500 assessed penalty. 
See NTA 2018 Annual Report, supra note 5, Executive Summary at 65. “It 
can be difficult or impossible for some taxpayers to obtain judicial review of 
what the IRS says they owe, especially low-income taxpayers and those sub-
ject to “assessable” penalties (i.e., penalties that can be assessed without first 
giving the taxpayer a notice of deficiency).”  
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low-income taxpayer, but where a penalty assessment is an as-
tronomically high figure, it can be beyond even the means of a 
supposedly “high-income” taxpayer—e.g., John Larson.19 This 
unfortunate outcome denies procedural due process to taxpayers 
at both ends of the income spectrum; likewise, it ensures the 
finality of essentially unreviewable IRS penalty determinations.20 
 Courts and Congress have each recognized that the hard-
ships and unfairness of this uniquely troubling outcome can 
result in a particularly insidious brand of inequity.21 Accordingly, 
in certain circumstances, where judicial review would only be 
available via refund litigation, the courts and Congress have carved 
out limited exceptions to the full payment rule.22 The judicial 
exceptions to the general rule allow for partial payment; Congress 
has, similarly, enacted partial payment mechanisms for certain 
(but not all) assessable penalties.23 The taxpayer in those situa-
tions can proceed to federal court, via refund litigation, and chal-
lenge the underlying liability without having fully paid the 
amount in controversy.24 
 For example, courts employ the “divisibility doctrine” to 
provide taxpayers access to judicial review in certain cases where 
the deficiency process is not applicable and full payment of the 
amount due would be prohibitive.25 In those instances, the court 
requires payment of just one of the divisible taxes and that partial 
payment of the total assessment serves as the predicate for sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.26 Likewise, Congress has enacted statu-
tory exceptions to the full payment rule for certain assessable 
                                                                                                             
19 See Larson II, 888 F.3d at 586. 
20 See NTA 2018 Annual Report, supra note 5. 
21 Id. 
22 Notably, judicially defined “divisible penalties” and congressionally enacted 
partial payment provision for certain (but by no means all) assessable penalties. 
23 See infra notes 86–87 (judicial) & 143 (statutory) and accompanying text. 
24 Id. 
25 See infra notes 86–87 and accompanying text. 
26 See, e.g., Diversified Grp. Inc. v. United States, 841 F.3d 975, 981–82 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016) (“If an assessment or penalty is merely ‘the sum of several inde-
pendent assessments triggered by separate transactions,’ ... it is considered 
“divisible” such that” the taxpayer may pay the full amount on one transac-
tion, sue for a refund for that transaction, and have the outcome of this suit 
determine his liability for all the other, similar transactions.” (footnote omitted) 
(citations omitted)). 
2019] TIME TO PRUNE FLORA: LARSON V. U.S. 133 
penalties.27 Notably, those statutory exceptions permit a tax-
payer to pay just 15 percent of the assessed penalty (if the other 
procedural requirements are met) and then seek judicial review 
of the full assessment via refund litigation.28 
 This Article briefly reviews the taxpayer opportunities for 
judicial review of IRS assessments, assessable penalties, the full 
payment rule, and the Larson opinions. The Supreme Court’s 
procedural due process jurisprudence is also reviewed. This Ar-
ticle then analyzes how the Second Circuit’s decision failed to 
consider the significant deprivation of a taxpayer’s constitutional 
right to due process that results from a blind application of the 
full payment rule.29 As a direct consequence of the Second Cir-
cuit’s refusal to adopt a limited hardship exception in Larson, 
taxpayers who cannot pay extremely high assessed penalties re-
main at the mercy of what is, in essence, an unreviewable para-
digm.30 This one-sided outcome is especially unnecessary because 
the Supreme Court itself has recognized that judicial exceptions 
to the full payment rule are appropriate in some circumstances.31 
 One unintended consequence of the denial of pre-payment 
judicial review in these instances is that taxpayers, for lack of a 
meaningful alternative, will be forced to seek refuge in the bank-
ruptcy court system.32 Ironically, the abdication of judicial over-
sight by district courts, in these cases, in favor of proceedings 
                                                                                                             
27 See infra note 143 and accompanying text. 
28 Id. 
29 An additional factor that raises both due process and equitable consid-
erations was mentioned by the Second Circuit—but not addressed further in 
its opinion:  
Eight years after the IRS notified Larson that he was under 
investigation, it informed him via letter that it considered him 
a tax shelter organizer with respect to the tax shelters in 
question. The letter noted that Larson therefore had a duty to 
register the tax shelters and was subject to aggregate penal-
ties of $160,232,026 for his failure to do so. 
Larson II, 888 F.3d 578, 581 (2d Cir. 2018) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
The fact that the IRS waited eight years before asserting that a taxpayer was 
liable for $160 million in tax shelter promoter penalties should, in and of itself, 
raise due process considerations. 
30 See NTA 2018 Annual Report, supra note 5. 
31 Most notably, the “divisible penalty” exception. See infra notes 86–87 
and accompanying text. 
32 See supra note 4 and infra note 243 and accompanying text. 
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initiated in bankruptcy courts, seriously undermines IRS efforts 
to collect taxes and its ability to administer the tax code—the 
primary rationale that underpinned the Flora rule.33 Moreover, 
the automatic stay in effect during the pendency of the bankruptcy 
action might prohibit any IRS collection efforts, which mirrors 
the similar halt to collection efforts that would be in place during 
any pre-payment judicial review in the Tax Court.34 
I. TAX ADMINISTRATION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 Generally, a taxpayer has two paths available for judicial 
review of IRS actions: deficiency proceedings in the Tax Court or 
refund actions in federal district courts.35 A taxpayer who has 
received a statutory notice of deficiency may challenge the IRS’s 
determination and avail herself of pre-payment judicial review 
in the Tax Court.36 Alternatively, the taxpayer may, instead, pay 
the asserted deficiency and then seek post-payment judicial re-
view in federal district court.37 However, in certain cases, the 
IRS is not required to issue a statutory notice of deficiency, the 
necessary prerequisite for the Tax Court to have subject matter 
jurisdiction.38 In those instances, taxpayers may not seek pre-
payment review in the Tax Court.39 A taxpayer must, instead, 
fully pay the assessment before judicial review is available, post-
payment, via refund litigation in federal court.40 
                                                                                                             
33 See infra note 88 and accompanying text. 
34 See infra note 243 and accompanying text. 
35 See, e.g., Larson II:  
A deficiency is based on a determination that more tax is due. 
According to the Supreme Court, a deficiency “is the amount 
of tax imposed less any amount that may have been reported 
by the taxpayer on his return.” Tax Court review is available 
for deficiencies and does not require payment of the deficiency 
prior to commencement of the action in Tax Court.  
888 F.3d 578, 581 n.3 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 
161, 173 (1976)). 
36 I.R.C. § 6213(a) (2012). 
37 Before the taxpayer can proceed to federal court with the refund action, 
she must first file a claim for refund with the IRS. I.R.C. § 6511(a) (2012) 
(prescribing time limitations on filing refund claim). 
38 See infra notes 62–67 and accompanying text. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
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A. Deficiency Proceedings 
 In what most taxpayers will recognize as a familiar fact 
pattern, the IRS first audits a taxpayer and then, as a result of 
that examination, determines whether additional tax and/or a 
penalty is due (the deficiency).41 This can result, for example, 
when the IRS asserts that a taxpayer has underreported income, 
overstated deductions, or some combination of both.42 In addition, 
the IRS may assert various penalties as a result of the under-
stated tax liability.43 Those penalties would be treated as “addi-
tions to tax” and are also reviewable as part of the deficiency 
proceeding in the Tax Court.44 
 Certain procedural safeguards are built into the system. 
The taxpayer can be represented throughout the audit, typically 
by an accountant or lawyer. At the audit’s completion, the IRS 
will issue a “30 day letter” and the taxpayer may then seek ad-
ministrative review of the audit determination by an appeals 
officer; the taxpayer may also be represented at these adminis-
trative reviews.45 It is the availability and adequacy of this ad-
ministrative review, serving as a substitute for judicial review, 
which is the touchstone of the Larson due process analysis.46 
 Following the administrative appeal, or after the expira-
tion of thirty days if no appeal is requested, the IRS will issue a 
formal statutory notice of deficiency, often referred to as the “90-
day letter.”47 The statutory notice of deficiency is the basis for 
                                                                                                             
41 See SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 6, at Ch. 8 (The Examination Func-
tion) passim. Following the proverbial “audit,” the IRS will formally notify 
the taxpayer of the amount it believes it due and owing via a statutory notice 
of deficiency. 
42 These are generally factual determination that result from the examina-
tion. For example, if the IRS revenue officer discovers that the taxpayer neglected 
to include dividend or interest income, that resulting increase in taxable income 
will, likewise, result in a larger tax liability. The difference between the “new” 
higher liability and that reported on the tax return is the “deficiency” the IRS 
will seek to collect from the taxpayer. 
43 See SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 6, at Ch. 7B (Civil Penalties) passim. 
44 Id. 
45 See SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 6, at Ch. 9 (The Appeals Function) 
passim. 
46 Larson II, 888 F.3d 578, 585 (2d Cir. 2018). 
47 I.R.C. § 6212(a) (2012). 
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the Tax Court’s jurisdiction.48 The taxpayer has ninety days in 
which to file a petition with the Tax Court and seek a redeter-
mination of the amount sought by the IRS.49 The time limit is 
jurisdictional and failure to file a petition within the ninety-day 
window deprives the Tax Court of jurisdiction to review the defi-
ciency.50 Otherwise, the Tax Court can review all aspects of the 
liability asserted in the notice of deficiency.51 
 The taxpayer, following an adverse determination by the 
Tax Court, may then seek review of that decision in the court of 
appeals. When the taxpayer has exhausted the available judicial 
remedies, the IRS then proceeds with its collection efforts.52 Statu-
tory interest will accrue on the unpaid balance until the liability 
has been satisfied.53 
B. Refund Litigation 
 In sharp contrast to deficiency proceedings, the taxpayer may 
opt to bypass Tax Court review and immediately pay the addi-
tional tax asserted by the IRS.54 Under this procedure, statutory 
interest will no longer accrue on the asserted liability.55 Instead, 
if the taxpayer succeeds in her refund action, the IRS will be liable 
for accrued interest on the amount refunded.56 As a prerequisite 
to the post-payment judicial review, however, the taxpayer must 
first file an administrative claim for a refund with the IRS.57 It is 
the IRS’s denial of the taxpayer’s claim for refund that then serves 
as the jurisdictional basis for federal court judicial review.58 Just 
                                                                                                             
48 I.R.C. § 6213(a) (2012). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 After the IRS has filed a Notice of Federal Tax Lien and before the IRS 
forecloses on the lien, the taxpayer may seek a CDP hearing. Following that hear-
ing, a limited judicial review is available in the Tax Court. I.R.C. § 6330(d) (2012). 
See infra note 207 and accompanying text. 
53 See SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 6, at Ch. 6 (Interest) passim. 
54 I.R.C. § 7422 (2012). 
55 Instead, if the taxpayer is the prevailing party in the refund litigation, 
the refund will include interest. 
56 See SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 6, at Ch. 11. 
57 I.R.C. § 7422(a). 
58 Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1340 (2012). 
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as the notice of deficiency provides jurisdiction for the Tax Court, 
the denial of the taxpayer’s refund claim is a jurisdictional re-
quirement for post-payment review.59 
 The federal courts can, like the Tax Court, review the tax 
liability in dispute.60 Similar to the post–Tax Court review process, 
a taxpayer may also seek judicial review of an adverse district 
court decision in the court of appeals. However, since the tax-
payer has already paid the tax liability reviewed by the district 
court, following the exhaustion of judicial remedies, the IRS does 
not seek additional payments or institute collection efforts against 
the taxpayer.61 Since both the Tax Court and district court deci-
sions are reviewable by the court of appeals, which particular route 
is taken by the taxpayer is generally governed by the ability to 
pay the underlying liability. 
C. Assessable Penalties 
 The IRS may, in limited circumstances, entirely bypass 
the deficiency process and assess certain penalties directly upon 
a taxpayer and demand that he make immediate payment.62 
These penalties must be paid “upon notice and demand”63 and are 
not subject to pre-payment judicial review in the Tax Court.64 
They cannot be reviewed by the Tax Court because a statutory 
notice of deficiency is not required, nor is one issued.65 It will be 
recalled that the statutory notice is the jurisdictional prerequi-
site for pre-payment judicial review in the Tax Court.66 Since 
the assessable penalty is imposed directly, without a notice of 
                                                                                                             
59 See § 7422. 
60 Id. 
61 If the refund action had involved a fully paid liability and the IRS pre-
vailed, the matter is closed (unless an appeal is undertaken). However, if the 
jurisdictional predicate was based on a partial payment, or a divisible penal-
ty, the IRS will then seek to collect the unpaid balance. 
62 I.R.C. § 6671 (2012) (“Rules for Application of Assessable Penalties”). 
63 § 6671(a). 
64 Williams v. Comm’r, 131 T.C. 54, 58 n.4 (2008).  
65 Id. (“[T]he ‘Assessable Penalties’ ... fall outside the deficiency notice re-
gime ... and thus fall outside this Court’s deficiency jurisdiction.”) (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted). 
66 Id. at 55. 
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deficiency, the taxpayer must seek judicial review in federal 
court rather than proceed in the Tax Court.67 
 When the Supreme Court decided Flora there were rela-
tively few “assessable” penalties in existence.68 “When the Flora 
rule was adopted, neither Congress nor the Court contemplated 
the large number of assessable penalties that exist today.”69 
Perhaps the most significant assessable penalty in existence at 
that time was the 100 percent penalty (or “trust fund” penalty),70 
which was not subject to the full payment rule because it was 
deemed “divisible.”71 Flora was decided in an era when assessa-
ble penalties were the rare exception, and the Supreme Court 
correctly assumed that most taxpayers, regardless of income 
level, could—and would—avail themselves of pre-payment judi-
cial review in the Tax Court.72 That tax practice axiom may no 
                                                                                                             
67 Id. at 58 n.4. 
68 Harvard Amicus Brief, supra note 18, at 3; see also NTA 2018 Annual 
Report, supra note 5.  
Moreover, the problems posed by assessable penalties have 
grown. When Flora I was decided, there were only four assessa-
ble penalties, but today there are over 50. This erosion of judi-
cial oversight is particularly inconsistent with the taxpayer’s 
right to appeal an IRS decision in an independent forum and 
right to a fair and just tax system. 
Id. at Volume One, 365 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted); see infra 
notes 110–11 and accompanying text. 
69 Id. 
70 I.R.C. § 6672 (2012). The Section provides:  
Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay 
over any tax imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect 
such tax or truthfully account for and pay over such tax or will-
fully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any such tax 
or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties pro-
vided by law, be liable to a penalty equal to the total amount of 
the tax evaded, or not collected, or not accounted for and paid over. 
Id. (emphasis added). A recent decision by the Fifth Circuit highlights the 
starkly disparate outcomes when the “divisibility” exception to the full payment 
rule applies. In McClendon v. United States, the IRS assessed $4.3 million in 
section 6672 penalties against the taxpayer. 892 F.3d 775, 777 (5th Cir. 
2018). He “paid a nominal portion of the penalties and then filed suit ... seek-
ing a refund of the portion paid and abatement of the penalties assessed.” Id. 
at 778 (emphasis added). 
71 Flora II, 362 U.S. 145, 175 n.38 (1960). 
72 Id. at 167 (quoting Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63, 69 (1958)). 
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longer be valid if the growing number of assessable penalties cur-
tail access to the Tax Court. 
 Instead, the only mechanism generally available for judi-
cial review of assessable penalties is the post-payment refund 
action in district court.73 The taxpayer must pay the assessed 
penalty in full and then file a claim for refund with the IRS.74 
The denial of that claim by the IRS serves as the jurisdictional 
prerequisite for district court review of the tax liability.75 If the 
taxpayer does not pay the full amount due, not only does the 
district court lack jurisdiction to review the assessed penalty, but 
also the IRS may proceed directly to collection efforts against the 
taxpayer.76 As a result, there is no judicial review of any kind 
available when the taxpayer cannot afford to pay the assessed 
penalty in full. This is not due process.77 
D. The Flora Full Payment Rule 
 Judicial review in district court is governed by the rules of 
refund procedure.78 Thus, a taxpayer’s ability to pay the assessed 
penalty is a paramount consideration in the quest to obtain judi-
cial relief in federal court of an IRS determination. According to 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation, however, to initiate that 
refund action in federal court first requires the taxpayer to fully 
pay the assessed penalty, followed by the IRS’s subsequent denial 
of the taxpayer’s claim for refund of the amount paid.79 If the 
                                                                                                             
73 A limited form of judicial review of the liability may be available follow-
ing a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing. However, if the taxpayer has had 
a “meaningful opportunity” to challenge the assessment prior to the CDP hear-
ing, judicial review of the liability itself is foreclosed. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(B) 
(2012). Hearings brought before the IRS Appeals Division constitute a “mean-
ingful opportunity” for CDP hearing purposes. See infra note 207 and accom-
panying text. 
74 Flora II, 362 U.S. at 177. 
75 See Harvard Amicus Brief, supra note 18, at 2–3. 
76 Id. at 2. 
77 See id. at 3 (“As a result [of the increased number of assessable penalties], 
we have arrived at an unfair set of circumstances in which the IRS has tre-
mendous power to levy severe assessable penalties and effectively deny taxpayers 
any judicial recourse due to their inability to fully pay the penalties before 
challenging them in court.” (emphasis added)). 
78 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012). 
79 I.R.C. § 7422(a) (2012). Section 7422(a) requires that a taxpayer must first 
file a claim for refund with the IRS before refund litigation may be commenced in 
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taxpayer’s means only permit a partial payment, it is impossible to 
access federal court jurisdiction—and no judicial review can occur.80 
 The statutory authority for the federal court’s refund ju-
risdiction is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1).81 In its 1960 deci-
sion in Flora v. United States, the Supreme Court, in a sharply 
divided decision, held that to properly invoke the subject matter 
jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1), the taxpayer must first 
pay the entire amount of tax (inclusive of penalties) asserted to 
be due and owing by the IRS.82  
 In other words, a partial payment would prevent the dis-
trict court from acquiring the necessary subject matter jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate the claim for refund. The statute itself does 
not mandate that all-or-nothing outcome.83 Instead, a majority 
of the Supreme Court construed it to require full payment before 
subject matter jurisdiction was acquired by the court.84 A minor-
ity of the Supreme Court in Flora II would have permitted a 
taxpayer’s refund action if less than full payment of the tax had 
been made.85 
                                                                                                             
district court. Id. The taxpayer must then wait six months, unless the claim is 
denied earlier, before the complaint can be filed. § 6532(a)(1). 
80 See Flora II, 362 U.S. 145, 177 (1960). 
81 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (2012) provides:  
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concur-
rent with the United States Court of Federal Claims, of: (1) Any 
civil action against the United States for the recovery of any 
internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or ille-
gally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been 
collected without authority or any sum alleged to have been ex-
cessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under the internal-
revenue laws[.] 
 § 1346(a)(1). 
82 Flora II, 362 U.S. 145, was a 5–4 decision. Justice Warren wrote the 
majority opinion for the Court and Justice Whittaker, with a short concur-
rence by Justice Frankfurter, wrote the dissenting opinion. Id. at 177, 178. 
83 See § 1346. 
84 Flora II, 362 U.S. at 177. 
85 Id. at 197 (Whittaker, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is no sound reason for im-
plying into section 1346(a) a limitation that full payment of an illegal assess-
ment is a condition upon the jurisdiction of a District Court to entertain a suit 
for refund. Inasmuch as no contradiction or absurdity is created by so doing, I 
think it is our duty to rely upon the words of section 1346(a), rather than 
upon unarticulated implications or exceptions. Particularly is this so in deal-
ing with legislation in an area such as internal revenue, where countless 
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 Despite the holding that full payment is required, the Su-
preme Court itself recognized a significant exception to the general 
rule it announced—for what are often referred to as “divisible” 
taxes.86 If a particular tax is divisible (e.g., the sum of individual 
components), the payment of just one tax (rather than the total 
demanded) is sufficient to maintain a refund action in district 
court.87 This significant exception to the general rule requiring 
full payment is a matter of judicial creation. 
 The primary rationale that animated the majority of the 
Supreme Court to adopt the Flora doctrine was the desire to 
protect the government’s ability to administer the tax system: 
[T]he Government has a substantial interest in protecting the 
public purse, an interest which would be substantially impaired if 
a taxpayer could sue in a District Court without paying his 
tax in full. ... It is quite true that the filing of an appeal to the 
Tax Court normally precludes the Government from requiring 
payment of the tax, but a decision in petitioner’s favor could 
be expected to throw a great portion of the Tax Court litiga-
tion into the District Courts. ... A full payment requirement 
will promote the smooth functioning of this system; a part 
payment rule would work at cross-purposes with it.88 
                                                                                                             
rules and exceptions are the subjects of frequent revisions and precise refine-
ments.”). A similar position was echoed by Justice Blackmun, also in dissent, 
sixteen years later in Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161 (1976). He observed 
that, “the full-payment rule applies only where a deficiency has been noticed, 
that is, only where the taxpayer has access to the Tax Court for redetermina-
tion prior to payment.” Id. at 208–09 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In Larson II, 
the Second Circuit was highly critical of his dissent in Laing: “Larson relies 
on Justice Blackmun’s dissent, but Justice Blackmun’s view did not garner 
majority support. No subsequent majority of the Supreme Court has adopted 
that understanding of the statute.” 888 F.3d 578, 584 n.8 (2d Cir. 2018). 
86 Diversified Grp., Inc. v. United States, 841 F.3d 975, 981 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(“It [Flora] did, however, recognize that in cases such as those involving ex-
cise taxes where the tax ‘may be divisible into a tax on each transaction or event,’ 
satisfaction of ‘the full-payment rule would probably require no more than 
payment of a small amount.’ This is because each excise tax is, legally, its own 
assessment (e.g., if a person is taxed $100 per widget for 5000 widgets, they 
receive 5000 different assessments), so paying the “small amount” that is the 
excise tax for one good would satisfy the full payment rule for that good.”) 
(citations omitted). 
87 Id. 
88 Flora II, 362 U.S. at 175 (footnotes omitted). One footnote the Court in-
cluded in the above-cited text is instructive of its concern that a relaxation of 
 
142 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:127 
Whether Flora provided a correct interpretation of 28 U.S.C. 
section 1346(a)(1) is not at issue for purposes of this Article. In-
stead, the focus is whether a blanket adherence to the full payment 
rule in assessable penalty cases, when its direct consequence is 
no judicial review at all, denies the taxpayer her constitutional 
right to due process of law. 
II. THE LARSON OPINIONS 
 The taxpayer, John Larson, was a remarkably unsympa-
thetic plaintiff.89 Larson was convicted for his role in the creation, 
promotion, and sale of abusive tax shelters and, as a consequence, 
                                                                                                             
the full payment requirement would open the floodgates of taxpayer abuse of 
the system:  
Permitting refund suits after partial payment of the tax as-
sessment would benefit many taxpayers. Such a law would be 
open to wide abuse, and would probably seriously impair the 
government’s ability to collect taxes. Many taxpayers, without 
legitimate grounds for contesting an assessment, would make 
a token payment and sue for refund, hoping at least to reduce 
the amount they would ultimately have to pay. In jurisdic-
tions where the District Court is considered to be a ‘taxpayer’s 
court,’ most taxpayers would use that forum instead of the Tax 
Court. Conceivably such legislation could cause ... chaotic tax 
collection situations ..., since there would be strong impetus to 
a policy of paying a little and trying to settle the balance. 
Id. at 176 n.41 (quoting from Lowitz, Federal Tax Refund Suits and Partial 
Payments, 9 THE DECALOGUE J. 9, 10). 
89 In December 2008, John Larson was convicted of 12 counts of tax evasion 
after a 10-week jury trial. Four months later, he was sentenced to 121 months in 
prison, together with the imposition of a $6 million fine. See “2 Ex-KPMG Man-
agers Sentenced Over Tax Shelters,” N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2009), https://www 
.nytimes.com/2009/04/02/business/02kpmg.html [https://perma.cc/2KEK-NQLU] 
(“Upon handing down the sentence, Judge Kaplan called the men’s behavior 
‘extremely offensive’ and said their fraudulent tax shelter scheme, which focused 
on clients who earned more than $20 million a year, was a ‘brazen act.’ ‘These 
defendants knew they were on the wrong side of the line,’ he said, adding later 
they had cooked up ‘this mass-produced scheme to cheat the government out 
of taxes for the purposes of enriching themselves.’ The losses through the scheme 
were estimated at more than $100 million.” (emphasis added)). Larson’s convic-
tion was affirmed by the Second Circuit in October 2010. United States v. 
Pfaff, 407 F. App’x 506, 511 (2d Cir. 2010). In a subsequent action, however, 
the fine imposed by Judge Kaplan was reduced. United States v. Pfaff, 619 
F.3d 172, 175–76 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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received a ten-year prison sentence.90 This post-conviction legal 
action concerns the civil penalties assessed against him by the 
IRS for the conduct that was the underlying basis of the crimi-
nal prosecution.91 
 As a tax shelter promoter, Larson had failed to register the 
two tax shelters he had marketed, as required by the Internal Rev-
enue Code.92 The IRS assessed penalties against him of approx-
imately $160 million.93 That figure was reduced to just over $67 
million, following an administrative appeal.94 Larson contended 
that the penalties were incorrectly calculated because loans and 
                                                                                                             
90 For a broader discussion of Larson’s role in the tax shelter industry, see 
generally TANINA ROSTAIN & MILTON C. REGAN, JR., CONFIDENCE GAMES: 
LAWYERS, ACCOUNTANTS, AND THE TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY (2014). 
91 No. 16-CV-00245, 2016 WL 7471338, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2016). 
92 I.R.C. section 6111(a)(1), in effect at the time, provided: “Any tax shelter 
organizer shall register the tax shelter with the Secretary (in such form and 
in such manner as the Secretary may prescribe) not later than the day on which 
the first offering for sale of interests in such tax shelter occurs.” See Larson II, 
888 F.3d 578, 581 (2d Cir. 2018) (“At the time Larson was organizing the tax 
shelters, the [IRS] required organizers/promoters to register [them] ‘not later 
than the day on which the first offering for sale of interest in such tax shelter 
occurs.’ I.R.C. § 6111(a) (1997) (current version at I.R.C. § 6111(a) (2005)).”); see 
also Diversified Grp. Inc., 841 F.3d at 978 (“Treasury Department regulations 
provided that ‘[r]egistration is accomplished by filing a properly completed 
Form 8264 with the [IRS]. The [IRS] will assign a registration number to each 
tax shelter that is registered.’ Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.611-1T, A-1, A-47.”). 
93 I.R.C. section 6707, which was in effect when the penalty was incurred, 
stated:  
The penalty imposed under paragraph (1) with respect to any 
tax shelter shall be an amount equal to the greater of—(A) $500, 
or (B) the lesser of (i) 1 percent of the aggregate amount invested 
in such tax shelter, or (ii) $10,000. The $10,000 limitation in 
subparagraph (B) shall not apply where there is an intentional 
disregard of the requirements of section 6111(a). 
See also Diversified Grp. Inc., 841 F.3d at 977 n.1 (“This version of ... I.R.C. section 
6707 ... [was] enacted on August 5, 1997 as part of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 
1997, Pub. L. 105-34. [It was] repealed on October 22, 2004, when [it was] ... 
replaced with the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-357. Be-
cause the actions in question occurred before 2004, we will refer to the pre-2004 
version[ ] of section 6707.”). 
94 Larson I, 2016 WL 7471338, at *1. “In December 2012, the IRS Appeals 
Office reduced the total penalty due to $67,661,349 to reflect penalty payments 
that had been received from other taxpayers who were jointly and severally 
liable with Larson.” Id. at *2. 
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loan premiums were included in the computation.95 Correctly 
calculated, he asserted, the penalties should have been roughly 
$7 million.96 
 Larson made a partial payment of just over $1.4 million of 
the assessed penalties and then sought judicial review via re-
fund litigation.97 Since the entire assessed penalty was not paid, 
the IRS sought dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.98 
The district court agreed and held that the full payment rule was 
dispositive.99 The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s 
dismissal on the full payment rule and, in addition, concluded 
that between the administrative review provided and the post-
payment judicial review available, Larson’s due process rights 
were not violated.100 
A. Southern District of New York 
 The District Court for the Southern District of New York 
was unpersuaded by Larson’s arguments that it could properly hear 
his substantive claims against the imposition and calculation of 
assessed penalties without his first having fully paid the assess-
ment.101 While the total dollar figure assessed was astronomically 
high (even after that sum was reduced by the payments made to 
the IRS by the additional joint tortfeasors), the court held that it 
was, nevertheless, powerless to adjudicate the matter because of 
the full payment rule.102 While the court expressed sympathy for 
                                                                                                             
95 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 4, Larson II, 888 F.3d 578 (2d Cir. 2018) 
(“In computing the penalties, the IRS interpreted the ‘aggregate amount in-
vested’ language in section 6707(a)(2) to include loans and loan premiums 
that were never actually invested by the participants in these transactions. ... 
The effect of including these amounts was to grossly inflate the 1% penalties 
from approximately $7 million (if the loans and loan premiums were not 
included) to $160,232,026 (if the loans and loan premiums were included).”). 
96 Id. 
97 Larson I, 2016 WL 7471338, at *2. “In February 2015, Larson paid 
$1,432,735 toward the penalty. ... Larson did not make any further payments 
toward his assessed penalties.” Id. 
98 Id. at *2. 
99 Id. at *6–7. 
100 Larson II, 888 F.3d at 588–89. 
101 Larson I, 2016 WL 7471338, at *6. 
102 Id. 
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the apparent dilemma that confronted Larson, it was convinced 
that the Supreme Court’s Flora holding was dispositive.103 
 The district court refused to accept the challenge to carve out 
what is often referred to as a “hardship” exception to the Flora 
rule.104 In so doing, it ignored that the original carve out to the 
full payment rule for divisible taxes was an exception of judicial 
creation. Instead, the district court insisted that the taxpayer’s 
only recourse in this untenable situation was a Congressional 
solution.105 According to the Southern District, Congress was more 
than capable of providing a legislative solution to help Larson.106 
 The district court was even less receptive to Larson’s due 
process argument.107 It was unconvinced that, despite the unde-
niable hardship, the full payment rule was a violation of the 
plaintiff’s right to due process.108 It observed that “courts have 
consistently rejected the argument that application of the full 
payment rule deprives the taxpayer of ‘fundamental due process’ 
in circumstances where the taxpayer is unable to pay the full 
amount.”109 The court, aside from a pair of citations, provided no 
analytical support for that conclusion.110 It, unfortunately, did not 
                                                                                                             
103 Id. at *1–2, 6. 
104 Larson I, 2016 WL 7471338, at *6. “Courts of appeals have also declined to 
carve a ‘hardship’ exception to the full-payment rule for taxpayers foreclosed 
from Tax Court review.” Id. In support, the Southern District cited two deci-
sions from sister circuits: Curry v. United States, 774 F.2d 852, 854 (7th Cir. 
1985), and Rocovich v. United States, 933 F.2d 991, 995 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Id. 
Notably, those cases were arguably inapposite. In both Curry and Rocovich, 
the taxpayers were issued notices of deficiency and each had access to the 
Tax Court. Neither Curry nor Rocovich involved an assessable penalty. It also 
cited the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Forma, 42 F.3d 759, 763 
(2d Cir. 1994), which involved an even more obscure fact pattern. In Forma, 
the United States was the plaintiff; it was the taxpayer, as defendant, who sought 
the tax refund as a counterclaim against the IRS. Like Curry and Rocovich, Forma 
did not involve an assessable penalty. 
105 Larson I, 2016 WL 7471338, at *6 (“[A]ny amelioration of that hardship 
is for Congress, not the courts.” (citations omitted)). See also infra note 235 and 
accompanying text for further discussion of the Curry decision. 
106 Larson I, 2016 WL 7471338, at *6. 
107 Id. at *5–6. “Larson’s reading [that] Flora I and Flora II [only apply when 
Tax Court review is also available] strains to find due process arguments where 
none exists.” Id. at *6. 
108 Id. (citing Johnston v. Comm’r, 429 F.2d 804, 806 (6th Cir 1980)). 
109 Id. at *5–6. 
110 Id. (“See Johnston, 429 F.2d at 806 (“‘While we appreciate that the 
payment of taxes as a precondition to sue for their return places a burden on 
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conduct any analysis of the due process issues implicated by the 
lack on any judicial review of the IRS assessment as a conse-
quence of its holding.111 
B. Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
 At the outset, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals took 
note of the district court’s “well-reasoned” decision that concluded 
the full payment rule was dispositive112 and application of the 
rule did not violate Larson’s right to due process.113 That was an 
inauspicious lead-in to the Second Circuit’s own consideration of 
Larson’s argument that his right to due process of law was vio-
lated because he could not fully pay the assessed penalty and 
would be denied any judicial review whatsoever.114 Instead, the 
Second Circuit concluded that Larson’s administrative review 
before the IRS Appeals Division was sufficient due process and 
did not run afoul of constitutional procedural safeguards.115 
 While it devoted more attention to the due process argument 
than did the Southern District, the Second Circuit nevertheless 
agreed with the lower court that, regardless of the hardship 
                                                                                                             
the taxpayer, we do not believe that it is such as to deny him the fundamental 
processes of fairness required by the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.’); see also Pfaff, 2016 WL 915738, at *4 [(D. Colo. 2016)] (‘plain-
tiff’s argument that required pre-payment of approximately $67.6 million violated 
his due process rights did not provide a basis for subject matter jurisdiction’).”). 
Johnston, also cited in the Second Circuit’s opinion, is discussed infra at notes 
122–23 and accompanying text. The Southern District’s citation to Pfaff was 
puzzling because of the summary disposition of the due process claim in that 
opinion. “Plaintiff does not include due process in his complaint. Plaintiff also 
fails to explain how an alleged due process violation confers subject matter 
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s tax refund claims on this Court.” Pfaff, 2016 WL 
915738, at *4 (citations omitted) [sic]. Those two sentences immediately precede 
the sentence quoted by the Southern District. 
111 Larson I, 2016 WL 7471338, at *4–5. 
112 Larson II, 888 F.3d 578, 581–82 (2d Cir. 2018) (“The Government ... ar-
gued that requiring full payment of the assessed penalties prior to any judicial 
review of the assessment did not violate due process. In a well-reasoned opin-
ion, the District Court agreed.”).  
113 Id. at 582. (“The District Court concluded that the full-payment rule 
applied to Larson’s § 6707 penalties and it therefore lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction”).  
114 See id. at 585.  
115 See id. 
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imposed by the assessable penalties, Larson was not entitled to pre-
payment judicial review—and it would not carve out a hardship 
exception to the full payment rule.116 Instead, the Second Circuit 
found that the “strong governmental interest in the efficient 
administration of the tax system as crafted by Congress” was a 
sufficiently compelling interest to rule against Larson’s due process 
claim.117 Accordingly, “[t]hat interest allows courts to conclude that 
adequate summary or administrative pre-payment review of tax 
assessment—with adequate post payment judicial review—
provides the required constitutional procedural protections.”118 
 One irony of the Second Circuit’s holding was its citation to 
Kahn v. United States119 for the proposition that “in the tax context, 
the constitutionality of a scheme providing for only post-assessment 
judicial review is well-settled.”120 Kahn, a 1985 decision by the 
                                                                                                             
116 Id. at 584. Quoting the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Curry v. United 
States, 774 F.2d 852, 855 (7th Cir. 1985), the Second Circuit agreed that 
“‘carv[ing] out a “hardship” exception to the Flora rule ... would endanger the 
“public purse” and disrupt the smooth function of the tax system[.]’” Id. 
117 Id. at 585. 
118 Id. Larson’s due process challenge asserted that, despite the substan-
tial penalty reduction to reflect payments from the joint tortfeasors, there 
was, nevertheless, no meaningful review afforded to his arguments by the 
Appeals Division. “Larson maintains that an administrative pre-payment 
review does not satisfy the requirements of due process.” Id. at 585–86. The 
Second Circuit did not view this as a due process issue. Rather, it interpreted 
Larson’s argument as a general dissatisfaction with the Appeals Division. 
This was not Larson’s contention. Instead, Larson argued that his actual 
experience with the Appeals Division, despite the penalty reduction, did not 
provide a meaningful review. What review conducted at the Appeals Division, 
aside from the mechanical subtraction of funds received from others tax shelter 
promoters, was not reported. 
In any event, whether Appeals review is constitutionally adequate 
in a particular case depends on the facts and circumstances of 
that case, and here the record is not sufficiently developed as to 
the adequacy of the Appeals review for the Court to make a find-
ing that Appellant is not entitled to judicial review. 
Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 16, Larson II, 888 F.3d 578 (2d Cir. 
2018) (emphasis added). 
119 Larson II, 888 F.3d at 585 (quoting Kahn v. United States, 753 F.2d 
1208, 1218 (3d Cir. 1985)). 
120 Larson II, 888 F.3d at 585 (citing Kahn, 753 F.2d at 1218 (citing Bob Jones 
Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 746–47 (1974))). While Bob Jones University 
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Third Circuit, may have been a poor choice as precedent to bolster 
the Second Circuit’s view that there was no procedural due process 
violation. The staggering $60+ million section 6707 penalty as-
sessed against Larson for failure to register two tax shelters was, 
simply stated, grossly disproportionate to the $500 penalty im-
posed upon Ms. Kahn for having filed a frivolous tax return.121 
 As if to compound the reliance on grossly disproportionate 
fact patterns, Larson’s citation to the Sixth Circuit’s decision in 
Johnston v. Commissioner (which was similarly relied upon by the 
district court in its opinion)122 was even more inapposite than its 
reliance on Kahn. Johnston involved an accuracy-related penalty 
of $67.19—which, astonishingly, the taxpayer was unwilling to 
pay.123 There was no averment that he was unable to pay the 
                                                                                                             
was a pre–Mathews v. Eldridge decision, it did include a significant admoni-
tion from the Supreme Court with respect to procedural due process and tax 
matters—which was not cited in either the Kahn or Larson opinions: “[T]his 
is not a case in which an aggrieved party has no access at all to judicial re-
view. Were that true, our conclusion might well be different.” Bob Jones Univ., 
416 U.S. at 746 (emphasis added). 
121 Kahn, 753 F.2d at 1211. In addition to the significantly disparate mon-
etary penalties, Kahn was a poor precedent because it involved an assessable 
penalty that, by statute, permitted partial payment (15 percent of the as-
sessed penalty)—a statutory exception to the full payment rule. Partial pay-
ment was not available in Larson II. See 888 F.2d at 585. The due process 
analysis conducted by the Third Circuit in Kahn focused solely on the validity 
of the 15 percent partial payment. The court had, and did in fact exercise, 
subject matter jurisdiction over the substance of Kahn’s penalty challenge.  
She paid 15% of the penalty as required by section 6703(c) and 
as specified by the penalty notice. She then filed a claim for 
refund of the $75.00 portion [15%] of the assessed penalty of 
$500.00 ... [and] brought this suit for refund in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging 
that the assessment of $500.00 and the collection of $75.00 
was “improper, illegal and erroneous.”  
Kahn, 753 F.2d at 1211. The full payment rule was not applicable, and not 
discussed, in Kahn. While the reasoning may have been somewhat analogous, 
to the extent the due process analysis in Kahn was applied by Larson II, it 
relied on dicta—by no means precedent. 
122 Johnston v. Comm’r, 429 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1970), aff’g 52 T.C. 792 
(1969). See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
123 Johnston, 52 T.C. 792, 792 (1969) (“Attached to the petition was a 
Treasury Department Form 4188 ... headed ‘Account Adjustment Bill For Tax 
Due.’ Below the heading was what purports to be a computation of a penalty 
in the amount of $67.19 and a reference to various statements on the back of 
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penalty.124 “Appellant acknowledges that were he willing to pay 
the asserted liability, he would have full opportunity to an adju-
dication of the validity of the taxes imposed in the District Courts 
of the United States.”125 Larson, conversely, was willing to, but 
could not, pay the assessed penalty at issue.126 
 Despite the large sum involved and the interplay of penal-
ties imposed upon other joint tortfeasors, the Second Circuit held 
that the administrative review provided by the IRS appeals office 
was sufficient due process.127 Aside from noting the dollar amount 
of the penalty was reduced by monies collected from other par-
ties who were jointly and severely liable, the Second Circuit did 
not examine the scope and content of the appeals office review.128 
Given that the administrative review Larson received at the 
Appeals Division was its basis for concluding he had received 
sufficient due process,129 the Second Circuit should have exam-
ined that review more stringently. 
 In addition, the Second Circuit discussed the three-factor test 
articulated by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge to be used 
when faced with a due process claim.130 There, the Court stated that 
courts should be flexible when considering the level of review that is 
appropriate.131 Unfortunately, not only did the Second Circuit give 
each of the three factors a cursory analysis, it also concluded that in 
each instance, the factor weighed in favor of the IRS and the 
government’s paramount interest in the administration of the 
taxation code.132 Again, these conclusions were reached without 
                                                                                                             
the form for further explanations. The reference statements advised that ... 
this notice is not the result of an audit of ‘your return.’”). 
124 Johnston, 429 F.2d at 806. 
125 Id. (emphasis added). 
126 Larson II, 888 F.3d at 589. 
127 Id. at 585. 
128 The same “offset” (or credit) for § 6707 penalty amounts paid by other 
joint tortfeasors was applied in Diversified Grp., Inc., 841 F.3d at 979. (“On 
January 16, 2014, the IRS reduced the amount due to $24,920,904 because 
the other $17,188,579 had been ‘[p]aid by [o]thers.’”) The initial penalty as-
serted against the Diversified Group was $42.1 million. Id. See also Pfaff v. 
United States, 2016 WL 915738 at *3, where the IRS initially sought $160.2 
million in section 6707 penalties, before offsets. 
129 Larson II, 888 F.3d at 585. 
130 Id. at 586–87; see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). 
131 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334. 
132 The Second Circuit’s entire consideration of the three Mathews factors filled 
slightly less than one page of its 11-page opinion. Larson II, 888 F.3d at 586–87. 
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a meaningful application of the Mathews factors to the actual 
facts presented by Larson II.133 
III. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE 
 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides for “due process of law” before any person can be “de-
prived of life, liberty, or property.”134 What amount of due pro-
cess is required to satisfy that constitutional mandate is entirely 
dependent upon context.135 For example, the due process required 
in a criminal case is significantly greater than that afforded in a 
civil matter.136 In Larson’s criminal case, the prosecution’s bur-
den of proof was “beyond a reasonable doubt.”137 Equally im-
portant, in criminal prosecutions, the government must prove its 
case before a judicial tribunal—and, if appeals are taken from 
that verdict, the subsequent appellate review is also provided by 
judicial tribunals.138 When fundamental liberty interests are at 
stake, nothing less will suffice. 
 However, at the other end of the legal spectrum, the Su-
preme Court has held that administrative tribunals and review 
are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process.139 This is 
often the case when property interests, as contrasted with indi-
vidual liberties, are at stake.140 In the civil tax context, for ex-
ample, the Supreme Court typically balances the government’s 
                                                                                                             
133 See id. 
134 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
135 In Mathews, the Supreme Court explained that “‘due process’ ... is not a 
technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circum-
stances.” 424 U.S. at 334 (quoting Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 
473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)). Instead, as Justice Powell, for the 
majority of the Court, observed, it is “‘flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands.’” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). 
136 See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277–78 (1993) (stating the Due 
Process Clause requires a finding of guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt” in a 
criminal prosecution). 
137 United States v. Pfaff, 619 F.3d 172, 174 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Ap-
prendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)). 
138 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see id. art. I, § 8. 
139 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348–49. 
140 See id. at 348; see also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 
341 U.S. 123, 162–63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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interest in the administration of the tax system and collection of 
tax revenues against an individual’s right to judicial review of 
the tax authority’s conduct.141 In the vast majority of those in-
stances, a taxpayer has the opportunity for judicial review prior 
to the government’s commencement of collection efforts over the 
taxes asserted to be due and owing.142 Against the general scheme 
of taxation, there are relatively few instances when a taxpayer does 
not have an opportunity for pre-payment (or partial payment) 
judicial review.143 
 In balancing the competing due process interests, the Su-
preme Court has instructed courts to examine three factors: 
(1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official ac-
tion”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, 
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) 
“the Government’s interest, including the function involved 
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional 
or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”144 
 Ultimately, “balance involves a determination as to when, 
under our constitutional system, judicial-type procedures must be 
                                                                                                             
141 Flora II, 362 U.S. 145, 175–77 (1960). 
142 Frank G. Colella, Ninth Circuit Holds Section 6694(c) Deadline for Re-
view of Tax Preparer Penalties is Jurisdictional and Affirms Dismissal of 
Refund Action, 94 TAXES MAGAZINE, No. 1, 19, 20 (Jan. 2019). 
143 Notably, Congress has created partial payment provisions for certain 
assessable penalties. Thus, while the full payment rule still applies, full payment 
of the partial amount is sufficient to invoke federal subject matter jurisdiction. 
For example, I.R.C. section 6694 imposes assessable penalties upon tax prepar-
ers who understate their client’s tax liabilities. I.R.C. § 6694(b) (2012). Section 
6694(c) permits partial payment (just 15 percent) of the entire assessed sec-
tion 6694 penalty. § 6694(c). While this is a significant statutory exception to 
the full payment rule, other procedural requirements must be met for federal 
court jurisdiction. See, e.g., Colella, supra note 142, at 20 (taxpayer failed to 
comply with shorter statute of limitations applicable to partial payment rule); 
Frank G. Colella, Partial Payment Rule of Code Section 6694(c) Continues to 
Trap the Unprepared Tax Preparer, 21 J. TAX PRAC. & PROC., 2, 23 (2019). 
144 Larson II, 888 F.3d 578, 586 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. 
at 335). The Mathews decision was a refinement of the Supreme Court’s ear-
lier due process jurisprudence. The Court had previously considered due 
process in connection with the tax system in Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 
U.S. 725, 737, 748–49 (1974), where it articulated a two-factor examination. See 
supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
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imposed upon administrative action to assure fairness.”145 In 
Larson II the Second Circuit held that an analysis of those three 
factors “militates against” against Larson and held that he was 
not denied due process of law.146 
IV. ANALYSIS 
 While it may be difficult to muster sympathy for Larson’s 
untenable position, especially given the extent to which his actions 
contributed to one of the largest tax fraud prosecutions in United 
States history,147 the procedural due process issue raised by his 
case required a much more detailed and thoughtful analysis than 
that provided by either the Southern District or the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. While the courts placed significant reliance 
on the penalty reduction provided by the Appeals Division, no 
evidence was introduced as to whether the Appeals Division 
actually considered Larson’s substantive arguments against the 
penalty imposition.148 
 More importantly, however, the Second Circuit’s analysis 
of the Mathews due process factors was cursory, at best. The court 
                                                                                                             
145 Larson II, 888 F.3d at 586 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348). 
146 Id. 
147 Stein v. KPMG, LLP, 486 F.3d 753, 756 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The underlying 
criminal prosecution is said to be the largest criminal tax case in American 
history. Nineteen defendants are charged with conspiracy and tax evasion, 
including the appellees, who are former partners or employees of the account-
ing firm KPMG. The defendants are alleged to have, inter alia, devised, mar-
keted, and implemented fraudulent tax shelters that caused a tax loss to the 
United States Treasury of more than $2 billion. In connection with the al-
leged tax shelters, KPMG entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with 
the government, agreeing to cooperate fully with the government and to pay 
$456 million in fines and penalties.” (citation omitted)). Larson was one of the 
original 19 defendants charged in the indictment. See supra notes 89 and 90. 
148 Larson II, 888 F.3d at 585 n.10. “Larson’s appeal to the IRS Office of 
Appeals resulted in a nearly $100 million reduction. Larson doesn’t take issue 
with his substantial victory at the IRS Office of Appeals; he does not adequately 
contend that it was neither an effective nor meaningful review of his complaints.” 
Id. at 585. The Second Circuit seemingly conflates the penalty reduction in and of 
itself, which was required by IRS regulations, with a “meaningful review.” Id. 
at 598. In fact, Larson argued that “Appeals never considered his challenges to 
the assessment,” beyond the statutory reduction itself. Appellant-Petitioner’s Peti-
tion for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 2, Larson II, 888 F.3d 578 (2d 
Cir. 2018) (No. 17-503) [hereinafter Petition for Rehearing] (emphasis added). 
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did not conduct a meaningful examination of the trio of factors 
and attempt to balance the competing interests at stake.149 Instead, 
it simply concluded the government’s interest was paramount.150 
For example, the Second Circuit completely ignored the impact 
of bankruptcy on Larson, personally, or the impact that such a 
filing would have had on the government’s overall administration 
of the tax system.151 Those additional considerations, while not 
dispositive, would certainly have been relevant to a more thought-
ful analysis of the Mathews factors. 
V. SCOPE OF THE APPEALS DIVISION REVIEW 
 The Second Circuit gave undue weight to the result of the 
administrative review of the imposed penalties. “Larson’s appeal 
to the IRS Office of Appeals resulted in a nearly $100 million 
reduction.”152 But that single factual observation, ipso dixit, does 
not dispose of the procedural due process question. Instead, Larson 
contended that the administrative review he received at the Ap-
peals Division “was neither an effective nor meaningful review of 
his complaints.”153 His primary contention, the substantive issue 
for which he sought judicial review, was that the IRS had incor-
rectly calculated the entire penalty assessed initially.154 He con-
tended that the $100 million reduction (which had certainly 
inured to his benefit) had been required by law and IRS regula-
tions,155 as an offset of the amounts already paid by other joint 
tortfeasors, and thus such a decrease in the penalty had been a 
required ministerial act.156 
                                                                                                             
149 See Larson II, 888 F.3d at 586–87. 
150 Id. 
151 See id. 
152 Id. at 585. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 See Petition for Rehearing, supra note 148, at 7 (emphasis added): 
[Larson] was entitled to credit for payments from other jointly 
and severally liable co-promoters under 26 C.F.R. section 
301.6707-1T. The IRS credited him with such payments during 
the Appeals process, but the IRS would have done this whether 
[Larson] appealed the assessment or not, as this was merely a 
mechanical application of the Treasury Regulation. 
156 Larson I, No. 16-CV-00245, 2016 WL 7471338, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 
2016). 
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 Larson’s overarching contention that the penalty itself 
was improperly calculated—and therefore unjustly imposed—by 
the IRS was simply ignored by the Appeals Division.157 Accord-
ing to Larson’s computations, the penalty should have amounted 
to roughly $7 million.158 That figure, while still substantial, was 
theoretically possible for him to fully pay and then seek judicial 
review via refund litigation.159 The $160 million, or even the $60 
million reduced figure, was an impossible sum to “fully” pay before 
having an opportunity to avail himself of judicial review.160 As a 
consequence, the only review available to Larson was at the ad-
ministrative hearing conducted by the IRS Appeals Division.161 
 The Second Circuit’s opinion was critical of Larson’s reliance 
on Phillips v. Commissioner162 for the proposition that “an adminis-
trative pre-payment review does not satisfy the requirements of 
                                                                                                             
During the appeals process, the IRS conceded that it had not 
credited Appellant for payments made by co-promoters. Liability 
under § 6707 is joint and several, such that all assessed persons 
or entities are liable for 100% of the liability, and payments of 
the assessed penalty by one liable party offset the liability owed 
by other liable parties. Treas. Reg. § 301.6707-1T. Consistent 
with this rule, after collecting payments from co-promoters, 
the IRS reduced the assessed penalty against Appellant from 
$160,232,026 to $67,661,349. 
Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 95, at 5 (citations omitted). 
157 The same methodology was also employed by the IRS in the computation 
of the section 6707 penalty in Diversified Grp., Inc. v. United States, 841 F.3d 
975, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The IRS calculated each penalty by, pursuant to sec-
tion 6707(a)(2)(A), computing the ‘aggregate amount invested’ by each client, 
multiplying this number by 1%, and summing this result across clients.”). 
However, in Diversified Group, Inc., the methodology of the computation itself 
was not at issue. Instead, only the question of whether the section 6707 penalty 
was “divisible” for purposes of the full payment rule was before the court—
and the court held the penalty was not divisible. Accordingly, the full payment 
rule applied to the section 6707 penalty. Id. at 980. See also Pfaff v. United 
States, No. 14-cv-03349-PAB-NYW, 2016 WL 915738, at *3 (D. Colo. Mar. 10, 
2016), which also held section 6707 penalties were not “divisible.” 
158 Larson II, 888 F.3d at 581 n.1. “Larson claims that the IRS incorrectly 
interpreted ‘aggregate amount invested’ in I.R.C. section 6707(a)(2) to include 
loans and loan premiums not actually invested by the transaction partici-
pants, resulting in substantially larger penalties than the approximately $7 
million the penalties would have totaled otherwise.” Id. 
159 See id. at 581 n.1, 585. 
160 Id. at 582. 
161 Id. 
162 283 U.S. 589 (1931). 
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due process.”163 As the court pointed out, “Phillips acknowledged 
that the two methods of review available in that case ... [pre- 
and post-payment review] satisfied due process, but Phillips did 
not conclude that due process required both.”164 The Second Circuit 
observed that: 
The Supreme Court in Phillips was clear. ... “The right of the 
United States to collect its internal revenue by summary ad-
ministrative proceedings has long been settled. Where ... ade-
quate opportunity is afforded for a later judicial determination of 
the legal rights, summary proceedings to secure prompt perfor-
mance of pecuniary obligations to the government have been 
consistently sustained. Property rights must yield provisionally 
to government need ... [to promptly] secure its revenues.”165 
 Whether either or both methods of review were available 
is an entirely different question from whether due process is denied 
if there is no judicial review whatsoever available to the taxpayer. 
The Phillips holding was premised on some form of judicial re-
view: “Where, as here, adequate opportunity is afforded for a later 
judicial determination of the legal rights, summary proceedings 
to secure prompt performance of pecuniary obligations to the 
government have been consistently sustained.”166 Providing an 
opportunity for “later determination of the legal rights” when 
the courthouse door is not only closed—but nailed shut—as a 
result of the taxpayer’s inability to fully pay an otherwise unre-
viewable assessed penalty is, simply, an illusory opportunity.167 
 In addition, the broad reading of governmental interest 
cited by the Second Circuit was not absolute; it was subject to 
limitation.168 In Commissioner v. Shapiro, the Supreme Court 
was critical of overstating the scope of Phillips.169  
This Court has recently and repeatedly held that, at least 
where irreparable injury may result from a deprivation of 
                                                                                                             
163 Larson II, 888 F.3d at 585–86. 
164 Id. at 586 (citing Phillips, 283 U.S. at 597–98) (internal citations and 
footnote omitted by Larson II Court). 
165 Id. (quoting Phillips, 283 U.S. at 595–96). 
166 Phillips, 283 U.S. at 595 (emphasis added). 
167 Id. at 589.  
168 See Larson II, 888 F.3d at 586. 
169 Comm’r v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614, 629–31 (1976). 
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property pending final adjudication of the rights of the parties, 
the Due Process Clause requires that the party whose property 
is taken be given an opportunity for some kind of predeprivation 
or prompt post-deprivation hearing at which some showing of 
the probable validity of the deprivation must be made.170  
 If “some kind of ... post-deprivation hearing” is constitu-
tionally required to satisfy the due process clause, it cannot be 
premised on the taxpayer’s ability to pay—if the Fifth Amend-
ment is to be given any meaningful application.171 
 Moreover, the Second Circuit did not examine the actual 
scope of administrative appeal that was conducted and whether 
it was “meaningful,” beyond noting that it yielded a “substan-
tial” penalty reduction.172 Likewise, the alternative, a prompt 
post-deprivation hearing is simply illusory if one cannot access 
the judicial system as a result of the full payment rule. Where a 
taxpayer is demonstrably unable to fully pay the assessed penalty, 
the notion she has access to post-deprivation judicial review is 
simply disingenuous. Under those circumstances, the taxpayer 
cannot receive pre-payment review (the Tax Court has no juris-
diction) and no post-payment review is available because the fed-
eral court will not exercise that jurisdiction.173 
 If only pre-payment administrative review is sufficient for 
due process protection, as the Second Circuit maintained it was 
in Larson II, then the very scope of the review conducted by the 
IRS Appeals Division must be reviewed to determine whether it 
met constitutional standards.174 The outcome of that review should 
not be conflated with the process of conducting the review. As 
Larson argued, “the Panel treated it [the substantial penalty 
reduction] as evidence that [he] received meaningful pre-deprivation 
review at the Appeals conference.”175 
 At a minimum, if the adequacy of the administrative re-
view served as the linchpin of the Second Circuit’s reasoning, 
the court should have remanded the case back to the Southern 
                                                                                                             
170 Id. at 629 (emphasis added); see id. at 629 n.11 (citing cases concerning 
deprivation of property).  
171 Id. at 629. 
172 Larson II, 888 F.3d at 586. 
173 See id. at 588. 
174 See id. at 586–87. 
175 Petition for Rehearing, supra note 148, at 7 (emphasis added). 
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District for additional fact-finding on that sole issue.176 Not only 
would jurisdictional discovery benefit the instant case—namely, it 
would permit a determination of the scope of the Appeals Division 
review of the Larson penalties—but also the court’s discussion 
would serve as model for future cases. 
 In any event, it would be a meaningful addition to the 
record of the instant case if it were known that the Appeals Divi-
sion had considered—and simply rejected—Larson’s computation 
of the penalty. If that particular fact was before the district court, 
or the Second Circuit panel, it would immeasurably bolster the 
determination of whether Larson received any consideration of 
his substantive argument (or whether the Appeals Division merely 
implemented a statutory offset). 
A. The Mathews Factors 
 The 1976 Supreme Court decision in Mathews v. Eldridge 
considered the appropriateness of a decision by the Social Security 
Administration that terminated a claimant’s disability benefits 
prior to its completion of a final evidentiary hearing.177 Eldridge, the 
claimant, challenged the termination as a violation of his consti-
tutional right to due process.178 In a six-to-two decision, the Court 
held in favor of the SSA and concluded that a pretermination hear-
ing was not required.179 In so holding, it reversed the decision of 
the two lower courts that had held Eldridge was entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of his benefits.180 
                                                                                                             
176 For example, see Haber v. United States, 823 F.3d 746, 753 (2d Cir. 
2016), in which the Second Circuit held that parties can obtain discovery related 
to jurisdiction. In Haber, the Second Circuit affirmed the trial court’s denial 
of jurisdictional discovery because the judge found the “plaintiff ‘failed to 
show how the information [she] hoped to obtain from this discovery would 
bear on the critical issue’ for jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Gualandi v. Adams, 385 
F.3d 236, 245 (2d Cir. 2004)) (citations omitted). Larson should be afforded, 
albeit belated, an opportunity to conduct jurisdictional discovery and expand 
the record. This would provide the court with the information necessary to 
determine whether the review was “meaningful” or otherwise. 
177 424 U.S. 319, 323 (1976). 
178 Id. at 325. 
179 Justice Powell wrote the majority decision. Justice Brennan, with whom 
Justice Marshall joined, dissented. Justice Stevens took no part in the decision. 
Id. at 322. 
180 Id. at 325–26. 
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 In reaching the decision, the majority adopted the three-
factor test which it employed to analyze the impact of the SSA 
conduct, relative to Eldridge’s right to due process.181 In a dis-
senting opinion, two Justices argued that the lower courts had 
correctly held that a pretermination evidentiary hearing was re-
quired.182 The dissent gave serious consideration to the harm 
Eldridge would suffer in the short-term, even if his benefits were 
subsequently restored.183 The trio of Mathews factors has, there-
after, served as the template for procedural due process analysis. 
B. The Private Interests Affected 
 It was to the first Mathews factor—the private interest that 
will be affected—that the Second Circuit gave a mere perfunctory 
nod: “Larson’s interest is not insignificant; the IRS has imposed 
onerous penalties that Larson claims he cannot pay.184 But, as we 
previously noted, the IRS Office of Appeals review resulted in a 
substantial reduction of Larson’s penalties.”185 Aside from noting 
his due process interest in judicial review of the assessed penalty 
was not insignificant, the court conducted no further examination 
into this factor.186 Moreover, because the penalty was substan-
tially reduced as a result of the Appeals Division’s decision, the 
Second Circuit concluded that the issue of Larson’s interest was 
sufficiently addressed.187 
 While the Second Circuit cited Morrissey v. Brewer for the 
proposition that “due process is flexible” and requires examina-
tion of the “particular circumstance[s]” to determine what level 
of protection is due,188 it overlooked a more compelling admoni-
tion from the Morrissey opinion: “Whether any procedural pro-
tections are due depends on the extent to which an individual 
will be ‘condemned to suffer grievous loss.’”189 Simply noting that 
                                                                                                             
181 Id. at 334–35. 
182 Id. at 349–50 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
183 Id. at 350 (Brennan, J. dissenting). 
184 Larson II, 888 F.3d 578, 586 (2d Cir. 2018). 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 585 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). 
189 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481 (citing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. 
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added) 
(quoted in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262–63 (1970))). 
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that Mr. Larson’s interest is “not insignificant” does not examine 
the harm that would befall him without the benefit of pre-payment 
judicial review.190 In Larson’s own words: “The private interest 
affected is that Appellant is faced with a massive penalty that 
he is, and likely forever will be, unable to pay, and which bears 
no relationship to money ever earned by him.”191 Given the sig-
nificant penalty imposed by the IRS and the dire consequences 
of Larson’s inability to pay it, a more detailed examination of 
this factor should have been conducted by the Second Circuit. 
 Moreover, not discussed was the likelihood that the impo-
sition of a $60 million penalty and his inability to pay it would 
necessitate Larson seeking bankruptcy court protection.192 The 
court’s refusal to permit judicial review under these circumstances 
would permit the IRS to commence collection efforts and allow 
for the attendant consequences to ensue.193 Initially, Larson could 
avail himself of a Collection Due Process hearing in the Tax Court; 
that would, seemingly, permit limited judicial review of the as-
sessed penalty.194 However, the CDP hearing would not, in fact, 
permit an examination of the underlying liability.195 Accordingly, 
the IRS would then continue with its efforts to secure payment. 
 Whether Larson could obtain judicial review in bankruptcy 
court, and whether that review would inure to his benefit, does not 
alter the wholesale disruption to one’s life (and perhaps stigma) 
that a forced bankruptcy filing would likely generate. To put 
this outcome in context, in Mathews, Justice Brennan, writing in 
dissent, observed that: 
I would add that the Court’s consideration that a discontinuance 
of disability benefits may cause the recipient to suffer only a 
limited deprivation is no argument. It is speculative. ... Indeed, in 
the present case, it is indicated that because disability benefits 
                                                                                                             
190 Larson II, 888 F.3d at 586. 
191 Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 118, at 13. 
192 See Flora v. United States (Flora II), 362 U.S. 145, 159 (1960) (quoting 
H. R. Rep. No. 68-179, at 7 (1924)) (discussing the possibility of financial hard-
ship created by the pre-payment rule). 
193 Chaim Gordon, The Disjunctive Test for Challenging a Liability in a 
CDP Hearing, 159 TAX NOTES 1615 (2018). 
194 Id. 
195 See infra note 207 and accompanying text. 
160 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:127 
were terminated there was a foreclosure upon the Eldridge home 
and the family’s furniture was repossessed, forcing Eldridge, 
his wife, and their children to sleep in one bed.196 
 Given the exponentially larger deprivation involved in 
Larson, relative to the Social Security disability payments before 
the Court in Mathews, and Larson’s demonstrable inability to make 
full payment of the penalties, the Second Circuit had an affirma-
tive duty to more fully examine the impact of the “private interests 
affected” factor.197 Had it conducted a more thorough analysis, it 
is unlikely the Court would have concluded that factor had been 
sufficiently addressed, without more, by the Appeal Division’s statu-
tory reduction of the penalty. 
C. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation 
 In refund litigation, the risk of an erroneous deprivation 
is redressed by federal court review.198 A finding in favor of the 
taxpayer results in a refund of the amounts paid, together with 
any applicable interest.199 That would restore the parties to the 
status quo ante. However, the Second Circuit addressed this factor 
summarily: “We are satisfied that the current procedures [ad-
ministrative review] effectively reduced the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation and gave Larson a meaningful opportunity to present 
his case.”200 While similar, it is a slightly different consideration 
from Larson’s argument that he did not receive a “meaningful” 
review at the Appeals Division.201 In considering the second 
Mathews factor, the Court was more concerned with the struc-
tural availability of administrative review than the more qualitative 
question of how meaningful the review was to the taxpayer’s case.202 
 The Second Circuit cited Our Country Home Enterprises203 
as authority for the proposition that administrative review is a “sig-
nificant protection[ ].”204 Ironically, this case actually undermines 
                                                                                                             
196 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 350 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
197 Id. at 334. 
198 SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 6, at 10–83. 
199 Id. at 11-147–11-148. 
200 Larson v. United States (Larson II), 888 F.3d 578, 586 (2d Cir. 2018). 
201 Petition for Rehearing, supra note 148, at 2.  
202 Id. at 7. 
203 Larson II, 888 F.3d at 586. 
204 Id. 
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the very point the Second Circuit sought to bolster. Our Country 
Home Enterprises increased, not decreased, the possibility of erro-
neous deprivation because it held the taxpayer was not entitled to 
a more thorough review of his assessment in the Tax Court, follow-
ing a CDP hearing.205 It actually foreclosed meaningful judicial 
review of the substance of the taxpayer’s liability because his ar-
guments had already been considered by the Appeals Division.206 
 Our Country Home Enterprises dealt with a Collection Due 
Process hearing and whether the taxpayer in that instance could 
challenge the underlying penalty assessment in the Tax Court 
following the outcome of the CDP hearing.207 Interestingly, it an-
ticipates the lack of judicial review Mr. Larson can also expect 
when, and if, he sought his own CDP hearing in the wake of the 
unsuccessful efforts to secure judicial review via the present litiga-
tion.208 Since he already presented his case before the Appeals 
                                                                                                             
205 Our Country Home Enters., Inc. v. Comm’r, 855 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2017). 
206 Id. at 788. 
207 A Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing is an additional procedural safe-
guard, enacted in 1998, to review IRS issuances of Notices of Federal Tax Liens 
and subsequent efforts to levy on that property. Following a CDP hearing, the 
taxpayer may seek limited judicial review of that decision in the Tax Court. 
Instead of the Notice of Deficiency, the jurisdictional predicate is the Notice of 
Determination, issued after the CDP hearing. Taxpayers have just 30 days fol-
lowing issuance of the Notice of Determination to request Tax Court review.  
While a taxpayer is entitled to have the underlying liability reviewed during 
this process—if she had not, earlier, been afforded a “meaningful” opportunity 
to challenge the assessment—any prior administrative review would negate 
that right. Our Country Home Enterprises (and a similar line of cases) held 
that review by the Appeals Division constituted a “meaningful opportunity” 
to challenge the assessment, and thus it denied the taxpayer’s effort to chal-
lenge the underlying liability. See generally Chaim Gordon, The Disjunctive Test 
for Challenging Liability in a CDP Hearing, TAX NOTES 1615 (2018) (“Because 
the IRS typically gives taxpayers facing assessment of taxes or penalties that 
are not subject to deficiency procedures ... an opportunity to dispute the liabil-
ity with IRS Appeals before assessment, these cases [inter alia, Our Country 
Home Enterprises] effectively deprive taxpayers facing assessable taxes and 
penalties of any opportunity to obtain pre-payment judicial review of the as-
sessments.”) Id. at 1615 (emphasis added). See generally SALTZMAN & BOOK, 
supra note 6, at 14B-2–14B-90. 
208 Our Country Home Enters., 855 F.3d at 784 (“Our Country Home and the 
government offer competing interpretations of what a prior ‘opportunity to 
dispute’ means. Our Country Home contends that a prior opportunity means a 
prior judicial opportunity; this interpretation would ensure Our Country Home a 
prepayment judicial opportunity to challenge its liability before paying the 
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Division, he received the “meaningful review” that would vitiate 
his efforts to have the liability reviewed in the Tax Court.209 
 Specifically, the Second Circuit cited its sister circuit’s Our 
Country Home Enterprises opinion for the proposition that: “In-
deed, the Seventh Circuit recently observed that the IRS Office 
of Appeals ‘is an independent bureau of the IRS charged with 
impartially resolving disputes between the government and tax-
payers,’ and that ‘Congress has determined that hearings before 
this office constitute significant protections for taxpayers.’”210 
 What the Second Circuit did not point out in its opinion 
was that the adequacy of the Appeals Division review provided 
to the taxpayer in Our Country Home Enterprises was not at 
issue.211 Rather, at issue was whether a taxpayer who took ad-
vantage of administrative review via the Appeals Division 
would, by that very action, thereafter be precluded, post-CDP 
hearing, from judicial review of that liability in the Tax Court.212 
While that precise scenario may, in fact, unfold for Larson, it 
was not the issue that confronted the Second Circuit.213 In con-
sidering the second Mathews factor, the question presented was, 
instead, whether an appearance before the Appeals Division 
mitigated the risk of “erroneous deprivation.”214 
 As for the level of scrutiny at a CDP hearing, it should be 
noted that the Seventh Circuit, in Our Country Home Enterprises, 
sua sponte, went on to observe that: 
 
Although CDP hearings provide taxpayers with additional 
procedural safeguards, calling the proceeding a “hearing” is 
somewhat misleading in that “there is no obligation to conduct a 
face-to-face hearing, no formal discovery, no requirement for 
either testimony or cross-examination, and no transcript.” 
                                                                                                             
$200,000 penalty. On the other hand, the government argues that a prior 
opportunity encompasses all opportunities—judicial and administrative alike; 
this interpretation eliminates the right to prepayment judicial review through 
the CDP process for taxpayers like Our Country Home who have already received 
prepayment administrative opportunities to contest liability.”) Id. (emphasis added).  
209 Larson II, 888 F.3d 578, 585 (2d Cir. 2018). 
210 Id. at 586 (citing Our Country Home Enters., 855 F.3d at 789). 
211 Our Country Home Enters., 855 F.3d at 780–82. 
212 Id. at 782. 
213 Larson II, 888 F.3d at 582. 
214 Id. at 586. 
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Moreover, a taxpayer has no right to subpoena documents or 
witnesses. And a CDP hearing need not include every party in 
interest. Indeed, far from constituting a formal hearing, a CDP 
hearing provides a taxpayer with nothing more than an oppor-
tunity for an informal oral or written conversation with the IRS 
before he must pay a tax.215 
 
 This is hardly a ringing endorsement, nor a satisfactory 
description of what one would demand for procedural due pro-
cess, even if the CDP hearing presupposes that an earlier level of 
administrative review had already been provided to the taxpayer. 
But it is this very limited second nibble at the proverbial apple 
that would be foreclosed for Larson, should he raise a similar ar-
gument at his own CDP hearing—because he had already gone 
before the Appeals Division.216 There would be no opportunity to 
reverse an erroneous determination nor even to consider whether 
an erroneous deprivation had occurred. 
 In fact, some commentators have applied a similar de-
scription to the very contours of the level of review provided by 
the Appeals Division.217 
Appeals is a division of the IRS, and it has proven to be a val-
uable and effective alternative dispute resolution mechanism 
within the agency. While a high percentage of cases at Ap-
peals settle without resort to litigation, Appeals falls woefully 
                                                                                                             
215 855 F.3d at 780 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
216 See supra note 207 and accompanying text.  
The opportunity for judicial review of the assessable penalty 
usually does not exist in CDP cases because, in almost every 
case, the IRS affords the persons assessed an assessable pen-
alty the opportunity for administrative review. According to the 
IRS, taxpayers may not contest the liability in the CDP hearing 
that could serve as a gateway to judicial review, even where no 
judicial review existed prior to the collection proceeding. 
Harvard Amicus Brief, supra note 18, at 12–13 (emphasis added). See also 
Our Country Home Enters., Inc. v. Comm’r, 855 F.3d 773, 784 (7th Cir. 2017) 
(“We acknowledge that the government’s interpretation effectively closes the 
door to prepayment judicial relief for taxpayers in Our Country Home’s posi-
tion. Nevertheless, we uphold the government’s interpretation[.]”). 
217 Lawrence M. Hill & Richard A. Nessler, IRS Penalty Assessments Without 
Due Process?, TAX NOTES 1763 (2018) (reprinted by Winston & Strawn LLP), 
https://www.winston.com/print/content/1014819/irs-penalty-assessments-with 
out-due-process.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YRC-2KDU]. 
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short of providing administrative due process to taxpayers. 
Although designed to be impartial, its impartiality is suspect 
when the decision-maker is an employee of the adversary. 
Appeals officers are employees of the IRS, and as mentioned, 
the chief of Appeals reports directly to the IRS commissioner.218 
 Also, the hallmarks of administrative due process are not 
envisaged at Appeals.219 Appeals officers are not administrative 
law judges—often they are not even lawyers—and there is effec-
tively no accountability if they make erroneous decisions.220 
There is no transcript of the proceedings at Appeals, no witnesses, 
no sworn testimony, no cross-examination, no reviewable record, 
and no written findings of fact or conclusions of law provided to 
the taxpayer or subject to review under any recognized standard, 
including abuse of discretion.221 
 None of procedural shortcomings listed above, all of which 
are specific to the administrative review afforded taxpayers by 
the Appeals Division, was considered, discussed, or even men-
tioned in the Second Circuit opinion.222 More importantly, each 
of the above is a hallmark of procedural due process.223 While 
the absence of any one might be excusable, denying the taxpayer 
all of the above tools to contest a liability is unimaginable. The 
Second Circuit’s view that the Appeals Division is a forum that 
can minimize the risk of erroneous deprivations is unsupported 
by both the barebones structure of the hearing and the facts. 
 A more accurate view of the Appeals Division was offered 
by the Ninth Circuit: 
Despite the division’s name, proceedings before the IRS Ap-
peals Office more closely resemble a settlement conference 
than a hearing before an administrative tribunal. The govern-
ing regulations refer to the proceedings as a “conference” ra-
ther than a “hearing,” describe them as “informal,” and focus 
on the “settlement” of disputes and the “settlement authority” 
of the Appeals Officers. ... The Internal Revenue Manual likewise 
describes the Appeals Office as the IRS’s “dispute resolution 
                                                                                                             
218 Id. 
219 Id. 
220 Id. 
221 Id. 
222 Larson v. United States (Larson II), 888 F.3d 578, 578 (2d Cir. 2018). 
223 Hill & Nessler, supra note 217. 
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forum” with the “authority to consider and negotiate settle-
ments,” ... and provides that its mission is “to resolve tax con-
troversies, without litigation[.]” ... Accordingly, the Appeals Officer 
or Settlement Officer does not act as a fact-finder or preside 
over adversarial proceedings in the model of an administrative 
law judge. ... There are no provisions for taxpayer discovery or 
for witnesses to be subpoenaed, testimony under oath is not 
taken (although affidavits may be required), and there are no 
provisions requiring that the proceedings be recorded or that 
any particular evidentiary rules be followed.224 
 The above description of the Appeals Office hardly comports 
with the procedural due process a taxpayer can expect from the Tax 
Court or a federal district court. Similarly, regardless of compar-
isons to the Tax Court or district court, the protections afforded 
by the Appeals Division are decidedly unlike those provided by 
review before an administrative law judge.225 
 Given the significant stakes involved, a more in-depth 
analysis of the second Mathews factor was required. As Mathews 
counseled, “to be considered here is the fairness and reliability of 
the existing pretermination procedures, and the probable value, if 
any, of additional procedural safeguards.226 Central to the evalu-
ation of any administrative process is the nature of the relevant 
inquiry.”227 In short, the relevant question is: what opportunity 
did the Appeals Division provide to Larson to argue his case? 
 In Larson, there simply was not enough information in 
the record to determine what sort of review was conducted by 
                                                                                                             
224 Central Valley AG Enters. v. United States, 531 F.3d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 
2008) (citations omitted). Central Valley concerned whether the Bankruptcy 
Court could exercise jurisdiction to review the tax liabilities before the court. 
There, the Ninth Circuit stated: “A conference with ... the IRS Appeals Office 
do[es] not satisfy the statutory requirements that a tax matter be ‘contested 
before and adjudicated by a judicial or administrative tribunal’ within the 
meaning of the statute.” Id. at 757–58. 
225 Hill & Nessler, supra note 217. 
226 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976). 
227 Id. (emphasis added). Not only did the Second Circuit fail to examine 
the thoroughness of the Appeals Division process, it faulted Larson for failing to 
document the shortcomings, where no record of the proceedings existed, stating: 
“he does not adequately contend that it was neither an effective nor meaningful 
review of his complaints.” Larson II, 888 F.3d at 585. Given that the lack of a 
record was entirely due to the inadequacies of the hearing conducted in the Ap-
peals Division, the Second Circuit could have remanded the case for that exact 
purpose—a limited determination of what transpired at the Appeals Division. 
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the Appeals Division. If, as he contended, all that was done was a 
mechanical subtraction of the additional § 6707 penalties collected 
from the other joint tortfeasors, can that be considered a procedural 
safeguard that mitigated the risk of erroneous deprivation? The 
Appeals Division review certainly resulted in a substantial re-
duction of what was allegedly owed, pursuant to the IRS’s own 
computations.228 But in Larson’s view, the computation of the 
penalty itself was erroneous.229 Since there was no record of what 
was considered, rejected, or adopted by the Appeals Division, it 
was misleading for the Second Circuit to say the existence of 
administrative review, in and of itself, satisfied the second 
Mathews factor. 
D. The Government’s Interest 
 The final Mathews factor requires balancing the cost of 
any additional procedural safeguards against the public interest 
sought to be protected.230 “In striking the appropriate due pro-
cess balance the final factor to be assessed is the public interest.”231 
The Second Circuit held the government’s interest in the collection 
of tax paramount to all other factors.232 “Lastly, the governmen-
tal interest here is singularly significant due to the careful 
structuring of the tax system and the Government’s ‘substantial 
interest in protecting the public purse.’”233 However, aside from 
the bare citation to the Flora II decision, it once again provided 
no discussion or analysis for this factor of the Mathews trio.234 
 How the extension of judicial due process safeguards to 
Larson, or by extension, a broader “hardship” exception to the full 
payment rule in certain limited circumstances, would negatively 
impact the government’s administration of the tax system was 
simply left unstated.235 While the data was not reported, it is 
                                                                                                             
228 Petition for Rehearing, supra note 148, at 7. 
229 Id. at 14. 
230 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 347. 
231 Id. 
232 Larson II, 888 F.3d at 586. 
233 Larson II, 888 F.3d at 586–87 (quoting Flora v. United States (Flora II), 
362 U.S. 145, 175 (1960)). 
234 Id. 
235 The Second Circuit echoed the District Court when it also cited Curry 
v. United States: “‘carv[ing] out a “hardship” exception to the Flora rule ... 
would endanger the “public purse” and disrupt the smooth functioning of the 
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unlikely that there exists a significant number of tax shelter pro-
moters who have been assessed multiple tens of millions of dollars 
in § 6707 penalties. Given the relatively small universe of as-
sessable § 6707 penalties, any impact on the IRS’s ability to ad-
minister the tax code in this particular case, or all abusive tax 
shelter promoter cases, would be minimal. In contrast, the benefit 
to the individual taxpayer of pre-payment judicial review would 
be substantial. 
 In addition, the § 6707 penalty is a not a self-reported tax; 
it is not included on a taxpayer’s tax return as part of the regu-
lar payment and filing compliance requirements.236 It is not an 
income tax.237 Thus, it is not what one considers part of the 
normal administration of the tax system. Moreover, it is a penalty 
that is not based on the taxpayer’s ability to pay—a typical met-
ric for calculating penalties.238 Instead, the § 6707 penalty is 
calculated based on the “aggregate amount invested” in the tax 
shelters at issue and not based on a percentage of the taxpayer’s 
own income or assets.239 
                                                                                                             
tax system.’” Id. at 589 (citing Curry v. United States, 774 F.2d 852, 855 (7th 
Cir. 1985)). Unfortunately, the Second Circuit glaringly failed to note that, in 
Curry, the Seventh Circuit did in fact entertain the possibility of creating a 
“hardship” exception to the full payment rule—but the Court concluded it would 
be a futile gesture, in this particular instance, because the statute of limita-
tions would, nevertheless, bar the refund action—even if the federal court could 
properly hear the refund claim. “Even if we were to carve out an exception to 
the pre-payment rule, the Currys would be barred from obtaining a refund by 
I.R.C. section 6511 [the statute of limitations applicable to taxpayer refund 
actions].” Curry, 724 F.2d at 855 (emphasis added). If the Seventh Circuit in 
Curry considered, and albeit rejected, a hardship exception when the taxpayers 
could not pay (“the Currys had not prepaid the approximately $60,000 in taxes 
shown to be owed on their original returns”), id. at 854, the Second Circuit was 
presented with a seemingly more compelling case and simply refused to dis-
cuss, much less consider, the possibility of carving out a hardship exception. 
236 I.R.C. § 6707(a)(1) (2012). 
237 Larson himself owed no income taxes. The sole liability at issue was for 
the § 6707 penalty. Larson II, 888 F.3d at 589. 
238 I.R.C. § 6707(a)(2). 
239 See Reply Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 118, at 12. 
The IRS calculated the penalties as a percentage of the “aggre-
gate amount invested” in the transactions at issue, and not 
based on any percentage of Appellant’s income or assets. Thus, 
the penalties bear no relationship to Appellant’s ability to pay, 
unlike most penalties that are computed on a percentage of the 
underlying tax owed. 
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 More interestingly, however, the impact on the public fisc 
was completely ignored.240 If Larson is forced to file for bank-
ruptcy protection, judicial review will occur in the context of 
bankruptcy protection.241 Given the automatic stay that is put 
into place during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding, the 
IRS might not be able to undertake collection efforts until the 
matter is ultimately resolved and the stay lifted.242 Moreover, 
there exists the real possibility that the § 6707 penalty could be 
discharged as a result of the bankruptcy243—which would leave 
the IRS with little or nothing left to collect.” 
 Viewed in this context, the additional fact-finding a remand 
would permit to determine the scope of administrative review is 
hardly a significant imposition on government resources. In fact, if 
the Second Circuit decided to craft a limited “hardship” exception 
                                                                                                             
Id. (emphasis added). 
240 Id. at 14. 
241 Id. at 21. 
242 Central Valley AG Enters. v. United States, 531 F.3d 750, 757 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
243 While the bankruptcy court’s exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. § 505 is discretionary, this is the precise situation where the court’s 
review of the tax liability is critical. “A bankruptcy court ‘may’ review certain 
tax liabilities, including unpaid assessable penalties that have not been con-
tested and adjudicated in another tribunal. However, the court’s authority to 
determine a refund is limited, and the court may abstain from determining 
tax issues for various reasons.” NTA 2018 Annual Report, supra note 5, Vol-
ume One at 372 (footnotes omitted). See, e.g., Central Valley AG Enters., 531 
F.3d at 755:  
One of the purposes of § 505, and in particular the purpose of the 
requirement that the tax matter be “contested,” is to “protect[ ] 
a debtor from being bound by a pre-bankruptcy tax liability 
determination that, because of a lack of financial resources, he 
or she was unable to contest.” And correspondingly, § 505 pro-
tects a debtor’s creditors “from the dissipation of an estate’s 
assets in the event that the debtor failed to contest the legali-
ty and amount of taxes assessed against it.” Such protections 
are particularly relevant in the instant case, as the Government’s 
tax claim far exceeds [taxpayer’s] assets and has priority over 
nearly all of its other liabilities, which predominantly consist 
of unsecured, nonpriority claims. 
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). A more fulsome discussion of the 
bankruptcy code and its specific application to the discharge of assessable 
penalties, or income taxes in general, is beyond the scope of this Article, but 
refer to SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 6, at Ch. 16, Part C (Collection of Tax 
Claims in Bankruptcy) and note 4 and accompanying text. 
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to the Flora full payment rule when the scope of administrative 
review falls short of constitutionally mandated procedural due 
process, the additional cost may tax the judiciary’s resources, 
but it would hardly imperil the IRS and its ability to administer 
the tax system.244 Alternatively, one could question the fairness 
of outsourcing “pre-payment” judicial review of assessable pen-
alties to the bankruptcy court because district courts continue to 
dismiss such cases for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
 While it is not easy to articulate a bright-line test that 
would permit pre-payment judicial review in situations where 
the Flora full payment rule would otherwise preclude it, proce-
dural due process requires just that precise remedy in some lim-
ited circumstances. As the Supreme Court has often stated, 
“flexibility” is a hallmark of due process analysis and, according-
ly, courts must be open to fashioning an appropriate exception to 
the full payment rule—especially in cases that could not have 
been envisioned when the Flora doctrine was announced.245 
 Unfortunately, not only was the Second Circuit unwilling to 
exercise that flexibility and fashion a limited remedy—or unwilling 
to permit a remand for limited jurisdictional discovery—but it 
seemed that every factor the court examined inured to the benefit 
of the IRS.246 Perhaps most disappointing, the court repeatedly 
                                                                                                             
244 Larson v. United States (Larson II), 888 F.3d 578, 584 (2d Cir. 2018). 
This particular point, that relaxing the full payment rule would not imperil 
the government, was specifically addressed by National Taxpayer Advocate 
in her report:  
Congress must have deemed the risk of pre-payment review ... to 
be minimal by 1924 when it established the Board of Tax Appeals 
(BTA) (i.e., the predecessor of the Tax Court) as a pre-payment 
forum to hear most tax disputes—or at the latest by 1969 when 
it established the Tax Court as an Article I court, independent 
from the executive branch. In 1998, when Congress established 
the right to a CDP hearing, it increased access to pre-payment 
judicial review by the Tax Court. Thus, Congress must not 
have been concerned that increasing pre-payment review by the 
Tax Court could threaten the existence of government. 
NTA 2018 Annual Report, supra note 5, Volume One at 376 (emphasis added). 
245 Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 118, at 19. 
246 Larson II, 888 F.3d at 583. 
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cited cases that were simply not germane to the due process 
inquiry; its decision incorporated cases that did not involve as-
sessable penalties,247 cases that involved relatively small sums248 
(and, in one instance the taxpayer refused to pay—although that 
sum was easily within his financial means249), and cases that 
interpreted the Collection Due Process provisions.250 Perhaps 
most glaringly, the Second Circuit failed to distinguish prece-
dents—cases in which the taxpayer had recourse to the Tax 
Court251 or could make a statutory partial payment.252 While 
any one of those authorities could have been distinguished in a 
straightforward manner, the cumulative number of inapposite 
cases underscored the impression that the Second Circuit would 
never have found a due process violation in the denial of judicial 
review of Larson’s § 6707 penalties. 
 It should be noted that the present-day wide-ranging as-
sessable penalty paradigm, where pre-payment review in the Tax 
Court is statutorily unavailable because the IRS does not need to 
issue a statutory notice of deficiency, simply did not exist when 
the Supreme Court decided Flora.253 But regardless of whether 
                                                                                                             
247 See Phillips v. Comm’r, 283 U.S. 589 (1931); United States v. Forma, 42 
F.3d 759, 763 (2d Cir. 1994); Rocovich v. United States, 933 F.2d 991 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991); Curry v. United States, 774 F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1985); supra text 
accompanying note 162.  
248 See Kahn v. United States, 753 F.2d 1208, 1208–10 (3d Cir. 1985); supra 
notes 119–21 and accompanying text. 
249 See Johnston v. Comm’r, 429 F.2d 804, 806 (6th Cir. 1970); see supra 
note 110 and accompanying text. 
250 See Our County Home Enters., Inc. v. Comm’r, 855 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 
2017); supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
251 See Rocovich, 933 F.2d at 993; Curry, 774 F.2d at 854; supra note 116 
and accompanying text. 
252 See Kahn, 753 F.2d at 1211; see supra notes 119–21 and accompanying text. 
253 SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 6, at 10–31.  
The gaps in pre-payment judicial review have grown. When 
Flora II was decided in 1960, there were only four assessable 
penalties, two of which were divisible[.] Today, by contrast, 
[the IRC] contains over 50 different assessable penalties (i.e., 
the penalties between IRC §§ 6671 and 6725). As the number 
of assessable penalties has risen, the fact that they cannot be 
contested in court before they are assessed and fully paid has 
become increasingly problematic. 
NTA 2018 Annual Report, supra note 5, Volume One at 377. 
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the Supreme Court could have anticipated that the full payment 
doctrine would have applied prospectively to the voluminous expan-
sion of assessable penalty cases,254 a taxpayer’s fundamental 
constitutional right to due process of law and the case law artic-
ulating the contours of that right make abundantly clear that 
the rule cannot be applied blindly.255 
 It would be ideal if Congress had provided a solution that, 
perhaps, provided for limited partial payment of all assessable 
penalties. But the absence of a Congressional solution does not 
justify the denial of due process. The Second Circuit noted: 
“While Congress decided to provide pre-payment review in some 
situations, its failure to do so when the penalty is beyond the 
taxpayer’s resources is not a due process defect. We know of no 
case that supports that view.”256 But the question presented to 
the Second Circuit was different: Did the failure to provide any 
judicial review deny Larson his constitutional right to due process 
of law? Unfortunately, Congressional inaction, or silence for that 
matter, simply cannot be used as a pretext to uphold the abridge-
ment of a taxpayer’s right to some form of accessible judicial review. 
                                                                                                             
254 As well-stated by the Legal Services Center of Harvard Law School’s 
Federal Tax Clinic in their amicus brief supporting reversal, “[w]ere Flora 
decided fifty years later, we believe that the Court would have restricted the 
full payment requirement to those taxpayers who had the option of pre-
payment litigation in the Tax Court.” Harvard Amicus Brief, supra note 18, at 
2 (emphasis added). 
255 Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that, while a post-payment pro-
cedure did not violate due process, it may have decided differently if no judi-
cial review at all were available. See Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 
746–47 (1974); supra note 120. If a taxpayer cannot pay the assessed penalty, 
the notion that she has access to any post-payment judicial review is a de-
monstrable illusion. There will not be, ultimately, any judicial review of the 
IRS’s assessment for that taxpayer. 
256 Larson v. United States (Larson II), 888 F.3d 578, 586 (2d Cir. 2018) 
(emphasis added). That view, unfortunately, may result in the availability of 
due process for only those well-off enough to pay for it. “Accordingly, taxpayers 
who are wealthy enough to fully pay can access these courts, whereas poor 
taxpayers and others subject to unreasonably large assessments are generally 
out of luck.” NTA 2018 Annual Report, supra note 5, Executive Summary at 
65 (emphasis added). 
